Hatch-Waxman and Medical Devices by Wallenfelt, Brian P.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 4 Article 6
2014
Hatch-Waxman and Medical Devices
Brian P. Wallenfelt
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation





HATCH-WAXMAN AND MEDICAL DEVICES 
Brian P. Wallenfelt† 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1407 
 II. MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION ........................................... 1409 
 III. COMPARISON OF DRUG AND DEVICE APPROVAL PROCESSES 1412 
A. Similarities Between NDA and PMA Requirements ........... 1412 
B. Differences Between NDA and PMA Requirements ............ 1414 
 IV. OVERVIEW OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND ITS 
APPLICATION TO MEDICAL DEVICES .................................... 1416 
A. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) and Paper 
New Drug Application (Paper NDA) ................................ 1416 
B. Patent Term Extension .................................................... 1418 
C. Uses Reasonably Related to Regulatory Submissions Are 
Non-Infringing ............................................................... 1419 
 V. THERE SHOULD BE AN ABBREVIATED APPROVAL PROCESS 
FOR CLASS III MEDICAL DEVICES ......................................... 1420 
A. Benefits Applicable to Generic Drugs Would Also Be 
Applicable to Generic Class III Medical Devices ................. 1420 
B. Abbreviated Approval Is Even More Appropriate for 
Medical Devices Than It Is for Drugs ............................... 1421 
C. Fairness to the Pioneer ..................................................... 1422 
 VI. EQUIVALENCY IN CLASS III MEDICAL DEVICES ..................... 1423 
 VII. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1425 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1984, the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act1 greatly 
simplified the approval process for generic drugs. It created the 
 
        †   JD, William Mitchell College of Law, May 2013. I wish to thank Frederik 
Struve for his insightful comments on earlier drafts. Although I am an attorney 
with the law firm of Merchant & Gould P.C., the views herein do not necessarily 
represent those of the firm or the clients of the firm. 
 1.  Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.). 
1
Wallenfelt: Hatch-Waxman and Medical Devices
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
1408 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:4 
abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process, which allows a 
generic drug to seek approval through establishing bioequivalence 
to a previously approved pioneer drug. The generic drug was thus 
able to avoid much of the time and expense associated with 
conducting clinical trials to prove safety and efficacy. This 
abbreviated approval process can lead to generic drugs entering 
the market more quickly. 
Although the ANDA process created by the Hatch-Waxman 
Act is certainly not a benefit to manufacturers of pioneer drugs, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act also included provisions that benefitted the 
pioneer manufacturers. Generally, these benefits take the form of 
extended patent rights. 
Like drugs, class III medical devices2 are also subject to a time-
consuming and expensive approval process that attempts to ensure 
the safety and efficacy of the device. But unlike drugs, an 
abbreviated approval process is not generally available for medical 
devices. This article will discuss the similarities between medical 
devices and drugs, and argue that an abbreviated approval process 
should be available for class III medical devices. 
This article will first provide a brief overview of medical device 
regulation and specifically the medical device approval process.3 
This article will also compare the approval processes for drugs and 
medical devices.4 Next, this article will discuss the Hatch-Waxman 
Act and its current application to medical devices.5 This article will 
then analyze whether an abbreviated approval process for medical 
devices would be beneficial.6 This article will also suggest a test for 
determining when such an approval process would be appropriate.7 
Finally, this article will argue that the similarities between medical 
 
 2.  Although the world of medical devices is quite expansive, this article will 
focus on those class III medical devices that are subject to the premarket approval 
process only. Class III medical devices are those devices “purported or represented 
to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of 
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health” or that 
“present[] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)–(II) (2012). Additionally, class III medical devices require 
the highest levels of controls to ensure safety and effectiveness. See id. 
§ 360c(a)(1)(C)(i). 
 3.  See infra Part II. 
 4.  See infra Part III. 
 5.  See infra Part IV. 
 6.  See infra Part V. 
 7.  See infra Part VI. 
2
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2014] HATCH-WAXMAN AND MEDICAL DEVICES 1409 
devices and drugs outweigh the differences and, accordingly, that 
there should be an abbreviated review process for medical devices.8 
II. MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION 
Until 1976, medical devices were regulated by the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) as drugs. Drugs are “articles 
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease in man or other animals; and . . . articles 
(other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function 
of the body of man or other animals.”9 This definition is much 
broader than the standard usage of the term drug. And, in fact, it 
had been held to encompass items that are now thought of and 
regulated as medical devices.10 
In 1976, a separate regulatory structure for medical devices was 
added to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA)11 with the 
enactment of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA).12 
Under the FDCA, a medical device is defined as “an instrument, 
apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro 
reagent, or other similar or related article,” which is “intended for 
use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other 
animals” or “intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
 
 8.  See infra Part VII. 
 9.  21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B)–(C) (2012). 
 10.  For example, the United States Supreme Court held that a laboratory 
diagnostic—one that never touched nor was even in the same room as the 
patient—was a drug and therefore was subject to the drug approval process. 
See United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 800 (1969). 
 11.  Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 331–397). 
 12.  Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). In addition to creating a 
separate regulatory process for medical devices, the MDA also removed medical 
devices from the reach of varied and potentially conflicting state regulatory 
schemes. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315–16 (2008) (noting that 
several states adopted approval processes in the seventies); see also id. at 342 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing “potentially conflicting state regulatory 
regimes”). The MDA addressed this with a broad preemption clause that 
eliminated most medical device regulatory requirements created by the states. 
See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (stating that no state “may establish or continue in effect 
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement” that is 
“different from, or in addition to, any requirement” of the MDA and “which 
relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device”). 
3
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body of man or other animals” and, to exclude drugs and foods, 
“does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical 
action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is 
not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its 
primary intended purposes.”13 This broad definition encompasses 
everything from the ordinary14 to the extraordinary.15 However, this 
article focuses on class III medical devices. 
The medical device regulatory structure includes an approval 
process for medical devices known as a premarket approval 
(PMA).16 Similar to the new drug application (NDA) process that is 
applicable to drugs, the PMA process is quite time consuming and 
expensive, requiring, among other things, information on the 
following: clinical investigations, principles of operation, and 
manufacturing facilities and controls.17 
The PMA process, however, is not required for all medical 
devices. Instead, medical devices are classified based on the level of 
controls required to ensure safety and effectiveness.18 And only 
those devices requiring the highest level of controls—class III 
devices—are subject to the PMA process.19 Complex, implanted 
medical devices, such as pacemakers,20 are typically among those 
classified in class III and subject to the PMA process. 
However, only those class III devices that were introduced after 
the enactment of the MDA require PMA approval.21 By default, 
devices introduced before the MDA do not require a PMA.22 The 
FDA may, however, override this default by regulation and require 
 
 13.  21 U.S.C. § 321(h). 
 14.  See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 872.6855 (2013) (“Manual toothbrush”); id. 
§ 872.6865 (“Powered toothbrush”); id. § 886.5850 (“Sunglasses”). 
 15.  See, e.g., id. § 880.5740 (“Suction snakebite kit”). 
 16.  21 U.S.C. § 360e. 
 17.  See id. § 360e(c)(1)(A)–(C); see also infra Part III. 
 18.  See id. § 360c(a)–(d). 
 19.  Id. § 360e(a). In addition, class III devices are “purported or represented 
to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of 
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health” or “presents a 
potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)–(II). 
 20.  21 C.F.R. § 870.3610; see also, e.g., id. § 872.3630 (“Endosseous dental 
implant abutment”); id. § 872.4760 (“Bone plate”). 
 21.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f) (classifying devices introduced after enactment of 
MDA as class III); id. § 360e(a)(2) (requiring PMA for devices that are class III 
devices because of § 360c(f)). 
 22.  See id. § 360e(a). 
4
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a PMA for even a pre-1976 device.23 In addition, to prevent pre-
1976 devices from having a monopoly, a new device that is 
substantially equivalent to a pre-1976 device is also not subject to 
the PMA process.24 
Those substantially equivalent devices are typically subject to 
the less rigorous premarket notification process, which is also 
known as the 510(k) process.25 Under the 510(k) process, a 
manufacturer notifies the FDA that it intends to introduce a new 
device, asserts that it is substantially equivalent to a pre-1976 device, 
and waits for an order from the FDA clearing the device.26 
Devices that enter the market through the 510(k) process 
often do so by establishing a substantial equivalence chain. The 
manufacturers of new devices assert substantial equivalence to a 
recently introduced device, the manufacturers of which had 
previously asserted substantial equivalence to a slightly older 
device, and so on until the chain reaches a device introduced prior 
to 1976. Each link in the chain can introduce incremental changes. 
The devices at the opposite ends of the chains may not have much 
in common at all.27 Nonetheless, much like the ANDA process 
available for generic drugs, the 510(k) process provides many 
benefits. For example, it fosters competition by allowing 
competitors to enter the market more quickly. But the 510(k) 
process is only available if the new device can be traced to a pre-
1976 device for which the FDA has not required a PMA. 
In contrast, there are few shortcuts for competitors wishing to 
enter the market for a class III device introduced after 1976.28 
Competitors typically may enter the market only after successfully 
completing the rigorous, time-consuming, and expensive PMA 
process. The PMA process often creates a barrier to entry that 
allows the pioneer to reap monopoly profits, much like the holder 
of a patent. Accordingly, competition may be stifled when it comes 
 
 23.  See id. § 360e(b). 
 24.  Id. § 360c(f). 
 25.  Id. § 360(k). Section 360(k) corresponds to section 510(k) of the FDCA. 
 26.  Id.; id. § 360(n). 
 27. This author has previously compared this to the children’s game of 
telephone. See Brian P. Wallenfelt, Foreword: Is It Time for an Abbreviated Premarket 
Approval for Medical Devices?, 39 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 1026, 1028–29 (2013). 
 28.  There actually are two potential shortcuts. First, a manufacturer may 
petition the FDA to down-classify the device. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(2)–(3). Second, a 
manufacturer may reference information (e.g., clinical trial data) in a PMA that 
was approved more than six years earlier. Id. § 360j(h)(4). 
5
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to devices subject to the PMA process—specifically, those class III 
devices introduced after 1976. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act, among other things, simplified the 
approval process for generic drugs with the creation of the ANDA 
process.29 However, because eight years earlier medical devices 
were separated from the regulatory structure applicable to drugs, 
that abbreviated approval process did not extend to medical 
devices. 
III. COMPARISON OF DRUG AND DEVICE APPROVAL PROCESSES 
Both class III medical devices and new drugs require 
regulatory approval prior to market introduction. A new drug may 
not be introduced until an NDA for it has been approved.30 
Similarly, most class III medical devices may not be introduced 
until an application for premarket approval has been approved.31 
In both cases, the regulatory processes require clinical trials, which 
are expensive and time consuming.32 There are other similarities as 
well. Both processes, at their core, aim to determine whether the 
product is safe and effective. 
A. Similarities Between NDA and PMA Requirements 
An NDA must include “full reports of investigations which 
have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use 
and whether such drug is effective in use.”33 Similarly, a PMA must 
include “full reports of all information, published or known to or 
which should reasonably be known to the applicant, concerning 
investigations which have been made to show whether or not such 
device is safe and effective.”34 Typically, these investigations take the 
form of clinical trials that are conducted to demonstrate that the 
drug or device is safe and effective. 
 
 29.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 30.  21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for 
introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an 
application . . . is effective with respect to such drug.”). 
 31.  Id. § 360e(a) (“A class III device . . . is required to have . . . an approval 
under this section of an application for premarket approval . . . .”). 
 32.  See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996) (discussing the 
“rigorous” PMA process); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 
(1990) (discussing “costly and time-consuming studies” required in an NDA). 
 33.  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A). 
 34.  Id. § 360e(c)(1)(A). 
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Additionally, an NDA must include “a full list of the articles 
used as components of such drug”35 and “a full statement of the 
composition of such drug.”36 Similarly, a PMA must include “a full 
statement of the components, ingredients, and properties and of 
the principle or principles of operation, of such device.”37 These 
requirements are very similar. The only difference is that the PMA 
must include a full statement of the principle of operation of the 
device. This reflects a difference in the nature of medical devices 
and drugs. Medical devices are typically designed to use mechanical 
or electrical components to perform a therapeutic function. This 
design needs to be explained to understand and evaluate the 
device. In any case, this information is quite similar and is used to 
evaluate the safety and efficacy of the drug or device. 
An NDA must also include “a full description of the methods 
used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, 
processing, and packing of such drug.”38 Similarly, a PMA also must 
include “a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities 
and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and, when 
relevant, packing and installation of, such device.”39 Again, these 
requirements are very similar. One difference is that the PMA 
additionally requires information about installation of the device. 
This refers to the procedure to implant or use the medical device. 
This information is not necessary for a drug, because, typically, a 
drug is not implanted. 
Additionally, an NDA must include “such samples of such drug 
and of the articles used as components thereof as the Secretary may 
require.”40 Likewise, a PMA requires “such samples of such device 
and of components thereof as the Secretary may reasonably 
require,”41 but if submitting samples is “impracticable or unduly 
burdensome, the requirement of this subparagraph may be met by 
the submission of complete information concerning the location of 
one or more such devices readily available for examination and 
testing.”42 These requirements are also essentially the same. The 
 
 35.  Id. § 355(b)(1)(B). 
 36.  Id. § 355(b)(1)(C). 
 37.  Id. § 360e(c)(1)(B). 
 38.  Id. § 355(b)(1)(D). 
 39.  Id. § 360e(c)(1)(C). 
 40.  Id. § 355(b)(1)(E). 
 41.  Id. § 360e(c)(1)(E). 
 42.  Id. 
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differences here recognize that delivering a sample of a device may 
be much more burdensome than delivering a sample of a drug. 
Finally, an NDA must also include “specimens of the labeling 
proposed to be used for such drug.”43 Similarly, the PMA also must 
include “specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such 
device.”44 Labeling is an expansive concept, which covers not only a 
traditional label, but also much of the information distributed by a 
manufacturer about an FDA regulated product.45 This requirement, 
which is identical for an NDA and a PMA, gives the FDA the 
opportunity to ensure the labeling is, among other things, 
adequate and truthful. 
B. Differences Between NDA and PMA Requirements 
Although there are many similarities between the NDA and 
PMA processes, there are also some differences. An NDA requires 
information that is not required in a PMA. Similarly, a PMA 
requires information that is not required in an NDA. These 
differences do not, however, impact the core of either the NDA or 
PMA regulatory structures. 
For example, an NDA must be accompanied by an assessment 
of the safety and effectiveness of the drug for the claimed 
indications in pediatric subpopulations.46 Similar information is not 
required with a PMA. However, this requirement is not related to 
the evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the drug. Instead, 
this relatively recent requirement47 was added to spur research into 
pediatric indications for new drugs. Thus, this requirement serves a 
secondary goal and does not affect the overall approval scheme for 
new drugs significantly. In fact, in some circumstances, this 
requirement can even be deferred or waived by the Secretary of 
 
 43.  Id. § 355(b)(1)(F). 
 44.  Id. § 360e(c)(1)(F). 
 45.  Id. § 321(m) (“The term ‘labeling’ means all labels and other written, 
printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or 
wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.”). Further, the Supreme Court has 
held that materials that are not on or in a drug package but are instead mailed 
separately can still accompany the drug and be treated as labeling. See, e.g., Kordel 
v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948). 
 46.  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(G); id. § 355c(a)(1)–(2). 
 47.  See Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 
1936 (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 355c). 
8
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Health and Human Services.48 For example, this requirement may 
be waived when the drug “is not likely to be used in a substantial 
number of pediatric patients.”49 
Additionally, an NDA must be submitted with a list of the 
patent number and expiration date of any patent that claims the 
drug or a method of using the drug.50 However, this provision is not 
used by the FDA to evaluate the safety and efficacy of the drug. 
Instead, it is published after the NDA is approved.51 The 
information is then used in the generic drug approval process 
created by the Hatch-Waxman Act. A PMA does not require similar 
information because there is no generic medical device approval 
process. 
Similarly, a PMA requires elements that are not required in an 
NDA. For example, a PMA must include references “to any 
performance standard . . . which would be applicable to any aspect 
of such device if it were a class II device.”52 Additionally, the PMA 
must include information to show that the device complies with the 
performance standard or information to justify a deviation from 
the standard.53 A performance standard is specific to a type of class 
II device and includes “provisions to provide reasonable assurance 
of its safe and effective performance.”54 For example, a 
performance standard may include “provisions respecting the 
construction, components, ingredients, and properties of the 
device,”55 “provisions for the testing . . . of the device,”56 and 
“provisions for the measurement of the performance characteristics 
of the device.”57 An NDA is not required to submit similar 
information, because there are no analogous concepts to classes 
and performance standards for drugs. 
As explained, there are many similarities between the 
information required in a PMA and an NDA. Although there are 
 
 48.  21 U.S.C. § 355c(a)(3)–(4). 
 49.  Id. § 355c(a)(4)(A)(iii)(II). This may be the case with a drug targeted to 
a condition primarily associated with adulthood or aging (e.g., erectile dys-
function, Alzheimer’s disease, or osteoporosis). 
 50.  Id. § 355(b). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. § 360e(c)(1)(D). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. § 360d(a)(2)(A). 
 55.  Id. § 360d(a)(2)(B)(i).  
 56.  Id. § 360d(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
 57.  Id. § 360d(a)(2)(B)(iii). 
9
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also some differences, the differences are often unrelated to the 
safety and efficacy determination that is central to both approval 
processes. Based on the comparison between the drug and device 
approval processes described above, the abbreviated approval 
process of Hatch-Waxman could readily be extended to devices. 
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND ITS APPLICATION 
TO MEDICAL DEVICES 
Three provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act are particularly 
relevant to medical devices and will be discussed in greater detail 
below. The first provision discussed is not applicable to medical 
devices, while the other two are. 
A. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) and Paper New Drug 
Application (Paper NDA) 
The Hatch-Waxman Act created a bargain of sorts. It created 
the ANDA process that focuses on similarity to an already approved 
“pioneer” drug. It also created an exclusive period following the 
approval of a new drug during which an ANDA cannot be 
approved. This exclusive period serves to reward the manufacturer 
for bearing the heavy burden of completing the new drug 
regulatory process. But after that exclusive period expires, 
competitors (i.e., generic drug manufacturers) may enter the 
market through the ANDA process without going through the time 
and expense of completing an NDA. This process aims to reward 
innovation while also spurring competition. 
Section 101 of the Hatch-Waxman Act created the ANDA 
process and the paper NDA process.58 Both of these processes 
create paths to approval of a drug that do not necessarily require 
conducting clinical trials to establish safety and effectiveness, as 
would be required for an NDA. These processes can allow a generic 
drug manufacturer to avoid significant time and expense.59 
Instead of including “full reports of investigations which have 
been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and 
 
 58.  Hatch Waxman Act § 101, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), (j). 
 59.  See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990) 
(stating that ANDAs and Paper NDAs “permit an applicant seeking approval of a 
generic drug to avoid the costly and time-consuming studies required for a 
pioneer drug”). 
10
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whether such drug is effective in use,”60 an ANDA must show that it 
is bioequivalent to an already approved pioneer drug.61 The ANDA 
must identify the pioneer drug, and the labeling for the generic 
drug must not prescribe, recommend, or suggest conditions of use 
that are not approved for the pioneer drug.62 
The pioneer’s efforts to develop and get the pioneer drug 
approved are protected in two ways. First, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
prohibits approving an ANDA until after a specific time period has 
passed since the pioneer drug was approved.63 In this manner, the 
pioneer drug receives a benefit for completing the NDA process. 
The duration of the exclusivity period corresponds roughly to the 
degree of novelty of the pioneer drug. For example, new uses of 
known compounds receive a shorter exclusivity period than entirely 
new compounds.64 
Second, an ANDA cannot be approved if doing so would 
infringe the patent rights of the pioneer drug. The ANDA must 
include “a certification, in the opinion of the applicant and to the 
best of his knowledge, with respect to each patent which claims the 
[pioneer] drug . . . or which claims a use for such [pioneer] drug 
for which the applicant is seeking approval” that addresses the 
patent owner’s rights.65 This certification may address the patent 
owner’s rights in multiple ways. For example, the generic drug may 
certify that there are no patents that cover the pioneer drug, or 
that all patents that cover the pioneer drug have expired.66 
Alternatively, the ANDA applicant may file the application but 
choose to wait until the patents that cover the pioneer drug expire 
to receive approval.67 Lastly, the ANDA applicant may assert that 
the patents covering the pioneer drug are invalid or would not be 
infringed.68 Filing this assertion is an act of infringement and 
almost always leads to litigation. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also created a paper NDA process.69 It 
provides many similar benefits to the ANDA process in that it can 
 
 60.  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A). 
 61.  See id. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
 62.  Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i). 
 63.  Id. § 355(j)(5)(F). 
 64.  Compare id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii), with id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii). 
 65.  Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 66.  Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(II). 
 67.  Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III). 
 68.  Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
 69.  Id. § 355(b)(2). 
11
Wallenfelt: Hatch-Waxman and Medical Devices
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
1418 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:4 
be used to avoid conducting new clinical trials. However, unlike the 
ANDA process, a paper NDA is not about proving bioequivalence.70 
Instead, in a paper NDA, the applicant still proves safety and 
efficacy, but does so using studies and data that were gathered by 
someone other than the applicant.71 
B. Patent Term Extension 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also amended the patent law to 
extend a patent term due to delays in entering the market as a 
result of the regulatory approval process.72 Typically, a patent 
application claiming a drug will be filed well before the drug is 
approved by the FDA. The patent term then lasts for twenty years 
from the date the patent is filed.73 This means that a portion of the 
patent term will pass before the product may be legally marketed.74 
Because the regulatory approval process often takes a long time, 
the effect can be significant. The Hatch-Waxman Act attempted to 
remedy this by providing a patent term extension to offset, at least 
in part, the delays associated with seeking regulatory approval 
under certain circumstances.75 
 
 70.  Compare id. § 355(b)(2), with id. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
 71.  Id. § 355(b)(2). 
 72.  Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98–417, § 201, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598–1603 
(1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006)). 
 73.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). Although the term of a patent was calculated 
differently at the time the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted, the effect was largely 
the same. For patents filed prior to 1995, the patent term was measured from the 
date of issuance and lasted for seventeen years. See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 
66 Stat. 792, 804 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 154). Section 154 was 
amended to provide a twenty-year patent term from the original date of filing by 
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, § 101, 108 Stat. 4809, 
4815–16 (1994). In any case, the effect was the same, a portion of the exclusive 
patent right often passed before the inventor was able to market and commercially 
exploit the product. 
 74.  Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669–70 (1990) (“When an 
inventor makes a potentially useful discovery, he ordinarily protects it by applying 
for a patent at once. Thus, if the discovery relates to a product that cannot be 
marketed without substantial testing and regulatory approval, the ‘clock’ on his 
patent term will be running even though he is not yet able to derive any profit 
from the invention.”).  
 75.  35 U.S.C. § 156. There are some limits to the extension though. For 
example, the term of only one patent may be extended due to the delay associated 
with the regulatory approval of a single product. Id. § 156(c)(4). 
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Unlike the provisions relating to ANDAs and paper NDAs, this 
section of the Hatch-Waxman Act expressly references and applies 
to medical devices.76 
C. Uses Reasonably Related to Regulatory Submissions Are Non-
Infringing 
Additionally, the Hatch-Waxman Act amended the Patent Act 
to carve out a safe harbor from infringement for activities related to 
regulatory submissions.77 As currently amended, this safe harbor 
states: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer 
to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the 
United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological 
products.78 
Although this section does not expressly state that it applies to 
medical devices, the Supreme Court has held that it does.79 The 
Court interpreted “submission of information under a Federal law 
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs”80 to apply to 
the submission of information under any provision of the FDCA.81 
The Court additionally reasoned that this safe harbor from 
infringement for activities related to regulatory submissions serves 
to offset the patent term extension provided by section 156. If this 
section did not apply to medical devices, a competitor would need 
to wait for the patent term and its extension to expire before even 
beginning to prepare a regulatory submission. This would create a 
“de facto monopoly” that “would continue for an often substantial 
period until regulatory approval was obtained” after the patent 
expired.82 
 
 76.  Id. § 156(f)(1)(B) (“The term ‘product’ means . . . [a]ny medical 
device . . . subject to regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act.”). 
 77.  Hatch-Waxman Act § 202, 98 Stat. at 1603 (codified as amended at 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)). 
 78.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 79.  See, e.g., Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 661. 
 80.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 81.  See e.g., Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 666. 
 82.  Id. at 670. 
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V. THERE SHOULD BE AN ABBREVIATED APPROVAL PROCESS FOR 
CLASS III MEDICAL DEVICES 
As discussed above, the requirements of a PMA and an NDA 
are quite similar.83 Additionally, the processes have the same goal: 
to approve only those products that can establish safety and 
effectiveness. Yet, the Hatch-Waxman Act created a shortcut for 
drug approval but not device approval. The ANDA process serves as 
a shortcut because it allows a new drug to receive regulatory 
approval through a showing of bioequivalence to an already 
approved drug. This section will explain why an abbreviated PMA 
process would be equally beneficial for class III medical devices. 
A. Benefits Applicable to Generic Drugs Would Also Be Applicable to 
Generic Class III Medical Devices 
Many of the reasons that supported the creation of an 
abbreviated approval process for drugs are equally applicable to 
class III medical devices. For example, the ANDA process was 
created to spur the growth of the generic drug market in the 
United States and, in turn, create a more competitive market with 
lower prices for unpatented drugs.84 An abbreviated approval 
process would serve the same goals in the market for unpatented 
medical devices. 
An additional benefit of the abbreviated approval process is 
that it provides for better allocation of societal resources both by 
applicants and by the FDA. In general, the resources (money, time, 
intelligence, etc.) devoted to conducting clinical trials and 
reviewing results of those clinical trials are not productively 
deployed when the product in the trial has previously been 
evaluated. The purpose of a clinical trial is to generate new 
information (e.g., whether a drug or device is safe and effective). 
Because a clinical trial conducted on a generic equivalent to an 
already approved product would be expected to generate the same 
results as the trial conducted on the pioneer product, the trial will 
 
 83.  See supra Part III.A. 
 84.  Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1344 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“A central purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act is ‘to enable 
competitors to bring cheaper, generic . . . drugs to market as quickly as possible.’”) 
(citing 149 Cong. Rec. S15,885 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003)); In re Barr Labs., 930 
F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Congress sought to get generic drugs into the hands 
of patients at reasonable prices—fast.”). 
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not generate new information. Accordingly, the trial will not 
produce any benefit even though conducting and reviewing it will 
consume significant resources. This reasoning is equally applicable 
to drugs and medical devices. Assuming equivalency is proven, 
there is no reason to expect that a clinical trial of a generic medical 
device would produce new information about the medical device. 
Accordingly, an abbreviated PMA process would lead to better 
allocation of resources than would occur if clinical trials were 
repeated on an equivalent but new medical device. 
Although it is always possible that more testing could identify a 
rare side effect or new issues relating to the safety and efficacy of a 
device, it is not likely. The clinical trials that are used to approve 
devices are designed to establish safety and efficacy to a high 
degree of statistical certainty. More testing is unlikely to alter the 
conclusions of these tests. And the costs of conducting these tests 
likely outweigh the possible benefits. In fact, if the opposite were 
true—that the expected benefits of more testing outweigh the 
costs—the pioneer should not have been approved in the first 
place. 
Additionally, there are also ethical benefits to an abbreviated 
approval process for both drugs and devices. Clinical trials 
generally include a study group and a control group of subjects 
who are in need of the therapy provided by the drug or the device. 
The study group receives the therapy (e.g., drug, device, etc.) being 
evaluated. The control group does not. Often, the control group 
receives no treatment whatsoever. If a drug or device exists and has 
been proven to be effective in treating a particular condition, it 
may be unethical to withhold that treatment from subjects in the 
control group simply to study an equivalent product. This 
reasoning is equally applicable to both drugs and devices. 
B. Abbreviated Approval Is Even More Appropriate for Medical Devices 
Than It Is for Drugs 
Although there are many similarities between devices and 
drugs, there are also significant differences. These differences, 
however, do not support imposing a more robust regulatory 
process for generic medical devices than exists for generic drugs. If 
anything, the differences suggest that an abbreviated review process 
makes more sense for devices than it does for drugs. 
For both devices and drugs, an abbreviated approval process is 
harmful to the pioneer manufacturer. The abbreviated approval 
15
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process lowers the cost and time required to for a competitor to 
enter the market. This of course cuts into the pioneer’s sales. 
However, the typical cost structures for medical devices and drugs 
suggest that the abbreviated process would be less harmful to 
medical device pioneers than it is to drug pioneers. 
For example, a generic producer will likely be able to avoid 
more of the costs associated with providing a drug than a medical 
device. This is because manufacturing costs are likely to represent a 
larger portion of the costs associated with a medical device than 
with a drug. Medical devices are usually assembled from multiple 
physical components, at least some of which may be custom 
manufactured for a particular device. These components and the 
skilled labor required for their assembly may be expensive. Drugs, 
on the other hand, are less likely to have these expenses. 
Instead, the costs of drugs are often attributed to the research 
and development costs associated with discovering and investi-
gating pharmaceutical compounds.85 Of course, medical devices 
also often have significant research and development costs. And in 
both cases, the generic producer can avoid these expenses by 
copying the pioneer. 
However, the generic producer cannot avoid the manu-
facturing costs. And since these may be more significant in devices, 
the generic manufacturer is comparatively less advantaged with 
medical devices than with drugs. This difference, if anything, 
suggests that the manufacturer of a pioneer medical device needs 
less protection than the manufacturer of a pioneer drug. 
Accordingly, the process for market entry by a generic medical 
device manufacturer should not be any more robust than the 
process for entry by a generic drug manufacturer. 
C. Fairness to the Pioneer 
A potential argument against an abbreviated approval process 
is that it would be unfair to the pioneer to allow a competitor to 
enter the market without undertaking the same regulatory 
expenses as the pioneer. Although a pioneer device manufacturer 
is treated differently than a generic one under an abbreviated 
 
 85.  See, e.g., Mathew Herper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion, 
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approval process, this is not necessarily unfair when the full context 
of the Hatch-Waxman Act, including its benefits, are considered. 
Additionally, creating an abbreviated approval process for medical 
devices would create fairness across industries in that drug and 
device manufacturers would be treated equally. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act created benefits to pioneer drug 
manufacturers to offset, at least in part, the potential unfairness of 
competitors having an easier path to market entry. If anything, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act currently unfairly benefits pioneer medical 
device manufacturers because it provides many of the benefits to 
medical devices without imposing the corresponding detriments. 
Most significantly, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides for patent term 
extension due to regulatory approval delays.86 As noted previously, 
this benefit is already available to pioneer medical devices, even 
though the pioneer medical device manufacturer is not subject to 
the detriment of competitors having access to an abbreviated 
approval process. 
Additionally, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides other pro-
tections for pioneer drug manufacturers that could be extended to 
medical device manufacturers as well. Under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, an ANDA may not be approved until a sufficient period of time 
has passed since the referenced pioneer drug was approved.87 In 
essence, the pioneer drug receives a period of market exclusivity in 
exchange for bearing the regulatory approval of the NDA process.88 
A similar delay before an abbreviated application could be 
approved would be appropriate for medical devices as well. 
VI. EQUIVALENCY IN CLASS III MEDICAL DEVICES 
An abbreviated approval process for class III medical devices 
would need to define the criteria for when a generic medical device 
is equivalent to a pioneer device and thus eligible to take advantage 
of the abbreviated process. This section discusses equivalency in the 
ANDA process for drugs and the 510(K) process for medical 
 
 86.  See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. 
 87.  See supra note 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 88.  This market exclusivity is not guaranteed. A competitor is always free to 
seek approval through the normal NDA process. In that case, however, the 
competitor is likely to incur similar regulatory costs as the pioneer did. 
Accordingly, this is not unfair to the pioneer. 
17
Wallenfelt: Hatch-Waxman and Medical Devices
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
1424 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:4 
devices and suggests relevant criteria for determining equivalency 
in an abbreviated approval process for class III medical devices. 
The process for determining equivalence for a class III medical 
device would have to be different from the process of determining 
equivalence for a drug. An ANDA must include information to 
establish bioequivalence.89 Generally, a drug is bioequivalent if “the 
rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant 
difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the” pioneer 
drug when administered similarly.90 This standard would not be 
applicable to medical devices because medical devices do not 
typically operate through absorption. However, “[f]or a drug that is 
not intended to be absorbed into the bloodstream, the Secretary 
may establish alternative, scientifically valid methods to show 
bioequivalence if the alternative methods are expected to detect a 
significant difference between the drug and the listed drug in safety 
and therapeutic effect.”91 Conceptually, this standard is as 
applicable to medical devices as drugs and could be the starting 
point of an equivalence standard for medical devices. 
A relevant standard is already applied to medical devices in the 
510(k) process. In the 510(k) process, a device may be approved if 
it is substantially equivalent to a pre-1976 device.92 There are two 
tests for determining substantial equivalence. First, a device is 
substantially equivalent if it “has the same technological 
characteristics as the predicate device.”93 Additionally, a device is 
substantially equivalent even if it “has different technological 
characteristics” if information is submitted “that demonstrates that 
the device is as safe and effective as a legally marketed device” and 
the device “does not raise different questions of safety and 
effectiveness than the predicate device.”94 
The first branch of the substantial equivalence standard would 
be equally effective as an equivalence standard under an 
abbreviated PMA process. This standard would not allow for the 
 
 89.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012). 
 90.  Id. § 355(j)(8)(B)(i). In some circumstances, a generic drug can be 
considered bioequivalent even though the rate of absorption is different, so long 
as the difference is “intentional, is reflected in its proposed labeling, is not 
essential to the attainment of effective body drug concentrations on chronic use, 
and is considered medically insignificant for the drug.” Id. § 355(j)(8)(B)(ii). 
 91.  Id. § 355(j)(8)(C). 
 92.  Id. § 360c(f)(1)(A)(ii). 
 93.  Id. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(i). 
 94.  Id. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii)(I)–(II). 
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long equivalence chains that are common in 510(k) applications.95 
Instead, it would require a stricter degree of equivalence. 
Additionally, an abbreviated PMA could require that 
equivalence be established to PMA-approved devices only and not 
to other devices that were instead approved through the 
abbreviated process. This too would eliminate equivalence chains 
by requiring that the equivalence comparison be made to the 
device that did in fact undergo extensive clinical trials and scrutiny. 
In light of the higher risk profile of class III devices, this degree of 
strictness may be warranted. While stricter than the 510(k) process, 
this standard would still encourage a robust generic device market 
for PMA-approved class III medical devices. 
In some cases, establishing this degree of equivalence may 
involve testing, including clinical trials. However, the purpose of 
the testing and trials would be quite different than the clinical trials 
conducted for a PMA. These tests would be focused on establishing 
equivalency—not on establishing safety and efficacy. Additionally, 
this testing may be necessary to establish that the manufacturing 
processes used by the generic manufacturer are sufficient. Again 
though, proving this is far different than proving that the device 
itself is safe and effective. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The innovations of the Hatch-Waxman Act should be fully 
extended to medical devices by creating an abbreviated approval 
process for class III medical devices that mirrors the ANDA process 
for drugs. As it currently stands, the regulatory approval process for 
new class III devices stands as a roadblock to market competition, 
creating a potential monopoly for pioneer medical device 
manufacturers that can extend beyond the duration of patents that 
cover the device. But the costs of regulatory approval processes are 
not the right tools for creating monopoly rights because the costs 
incurred to undertake repeated regulatory submissions on identical 
products are wasted. Instead, the medical device regulatory system 
should aim to facilitate market entry by competitors when the 
patent on a medical device expires. This is just what an abbreviated 
approval process would do. 
Drugs have an abbreviated approval process, while class III 
medical devices do not. There is no reason that these two industries 
 
 95.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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that are so important to health care should be regulated so 
differently. The differences between medical devices and 
pharmaceuticals do not justify this disparate treatment. 
The addition of an abbreviated review process for class III 
medical devices would also remedy an imbalance in the way the 
Hatch-Waxman Act is applied to medical devices. Many of the 
benefits of the Hatch-Waxman Act are currently extended to 
pioneer medical device manufacturers but the detriments are not. 
This creates a playing field that may be unfairly slanted in favor of 
the pioneer medical device manufacturer. 
Additionally, extending the Hatch-Waxman Act to class III 
devices would potentially create a more robust generic market for 
medical devices. Further, it is unlikely that the abbreviated review 
process would stifle innovation in the medical device marketplace. 
It certainly has not done so for drugs. 
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